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Abstract
We consider a simple variant of the von Neumann model of an expanding economy, in
which multiple producers make goods according to their production function. The players
trade their goods at the market and then use the bundles acquired for the production in the
next round. We study a simple decentralized dynamic—known as proportional response—in
which players update their bids proportionally to how useful the investments were in the
past round.
We show this dynamic leads to growth of the economy in the long term (whenever
growth is possible) but also creates unbounded inequality, i.e. very rich and very poor
players emerge. We analyze several other phenomena, such as how the relation of a player
with others influences its development and the Gini index of the system.
One of the key technical findings is that the players learn a global feature of the network
(the optimal cycle) in a decentralized way, while interacting locally with their direct neigh-
bors. We obtain this by studying the volume in the resulting dynamical system and showing
that the volume of each cycle expands or contracts by a constant factor in each round.
1 Introduction
Market equilibria are central objects of study in economic theory [Wal74, AD54, BS00]. How-
ever, the notion of an equilibrium deliberately abstracts away how such equilibria are reached or
even whether they are reached at all. On this topic, Fisher [Fis83] writes: “Whether or not the
actual economy is stable, we largely lack a convincing theory of why that should be so. Lacking
such a theory, we do not have an adequate theory of value, and there is an important lacuna in
the center of microeconomic theory... To only look at situations where the Invisible Hand has
finished its work cannot lead to a real understanding of how that work is accomplished.” This
issue is only compounded by the computational complexity results on the hardness of computing
various notions of equilibria even in simple models [CDDT09a, NRTV07].
There has, of course, been a vast amount of work done on understanding various market
dynamics and whether and how they converge to an equilibrium [Qua96, WZ07, CF08, Zha11,
CCD13, MPP15] as well as the computational implications of such dynamics [CMV05, CPV05,
CF08, CCD13]. In this paper we are interested in growth in production markets, a scenario
whose whole point is that we do not expect (or desire) the economy to approach an equilibrium,
but rather to “expand”. Our model is a simple variant of the pioneering model of an expanding
economy due to von Neumann [vN46], where the goods are substitutes (the initial model was for
perfect complements), represented through additive production functions [Gal89]. The work of
von Neumann as well as most of the literature following that focused on analyzing equilibrium-
like states where all components of the economy expand by the same constant factor as time
progresses. In contrast, we focus on the dynamics themselves, and analyze scenarios that
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in no sense approach any stable point. We will be interested in understanding which market
mechanisms lead to growth in the long run when the players act in a decentralized way, regardless
of whether equilibrium states are ever reached or not.
1.1 Model Overview and Example
In our model we have n producers, each can only produce one type of (eponymous) good
according to his endowed production function, using as inputs various amounts of other goods
in the system. In the simplest case, on which we focus, these production functions are simply
additive. The main decision that the “economy needs to make” is that of the allocation of
resources: for every time unit t, how do we split the goods produced at time t between the
different producers who need to use them to produce goods for time t+1. The model allows for
circular dependencies, which are useful for capturing situations in which people would use each
other’s products, such as a baker using a computer and the person making computers eating
bread. Our goal is growth: having the amounts of resources in the economy increase with time
(e.g. more bread, computers, scientific discoveries).
Here is a simple example with two producers:
• Every time unit, producer A can make 0.1 units of good A from every unit of good B,
and 0.99 units of good A from every unit of good A.1
• Every time unit, producer B can make 10.2 units of good B from every unit of good A,
and 0.99 units of good B from every unit of good B.
Looking globally, it is clear that the producers should cooperate in this production market:
if each good is allocated back to its own producer (i.e. agent A gets all the existing quantity
xt of good A, and produces from it xt+1 = 0.99xt units of good A, and similarly for B) then
the economy will shrink. If on the other hand we allocate the whole quantity of good A each
time unit to producer B, and all of good B to producer A, then the economy will grow: xt
units of good A will produce yt+1 = 10.2 · xt units of good B, which in turn will produce
xt+2 = 0.1 · yt+1 = 1.02 · xt units of good A. The question we ask in this paper is whether and
how this growth can be achieved using natural decentralized dynamics. After all, agent B needs
significant foresight in order to send essentially everything that he produces to agent A (if he
keeps even 2% to himself then the economy will not be able to grow).
It is not hard to globally characterize whether a general market with additive production
functions can keep growing in an unbounded way under a globally-optimal allocation of resources
– see Theorem 3. We would like to find a “local mechanism” where individual actions by the
different producers that use only information they posses can achieve such unbounded growth,
whenever growth is possible in the first place. Leaving the space of allowed “mechanisms”
intentionally vague, our goal is the following:
Definition: A mechanism is called universal if for any market with additive production func-
tions that can grow (in an unbounded manner) under an optimal allocation of resources, the
market also grows in an unbounded manner by following the mechanism.
1.2 Our Results
Here is the basic class of mechanisms that we study. In these, each producer starts with a
certain amount of his good that can be used to produce other goods, as well as an amount
1I.e., a unit of good A that stays with producer A loses 1% of its quantity every time unit.
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of “money” (budget) with no intrinsic value but used for trading. At each time unit, every
producer splits (all of) his current money into bids that he places on each of the goods. Then
each producer sells his good to the producers that bid on it (and collects all the money from
these bids).
The basic decisions each producer must make in every time unit are (i) how to split his
money into bids and (ii) how to allocate his good to the bidders depending on their bids. The
mechanism we analyze uses the following rules:
• Trading Posts: In each time unit, the producers come to the market with money and
goods. Each player bids on the goods and every good is allocated among its bidders in
proportion to the bid amount. Each player collects the money from selling its good and
takes home the bundle purchased, from which it produces for the next time unit.
In our example, if producer A bid $0.2 on good A while producer B bid $0.3 on good A,
then producer A gets 40% of the quantity of good A while producer B gets 60%; producer
A collects $0.5 from selling its good, which becomes its new budget.
• Proportional Updates: In each time unit, every producer splits his money into bids
on the goods in a way that is proportional to the amount he produced from that good in
the last round. For example, if in the previous round producer A got 0.5 units of good A,
from which it produced 0.99 ·0.5 units of good A and got 0.3 units of good B from which it
produced 0.1·0.3 units of good A, then he will bid a fraction (0.99·0.5)/(0.99·0.5+0.1·0.3) ≈
94.2% of his money on good A and the rest of ≈ 5.4% on good B.
(a) Amounts of the producers (b) Budget of producer 2
Figure 1: Two producer economy given by ~a = [[0.99, 0.1], [10.2, 0.99]]. The initial amounts are
(1, 2), while all the initial bids are 0.5. Producer 1 is shown with blue and 2 with red. The X
axis shows the time unit.
Trading Posts have been introduced by Shapley and Shubik to explain the formation of
prices in the exchange economy [SS77, Shu16]. The “bid” of a player on a good can be seen as
its spending on that good.
The proportional update is also known as “proportional response” and has been studied
before in several works. In static models such as Fisher markets, where the players repeatedly
come to the market with the same amount of goods and money, Trading post with proportional
updates (aka the proportional response dynamic) converges to market equilibria [WZ07, Zha11].
This convergence holds for a large class of valuations known as constant elasticity of substitution.
In fact, for additive valuations in the static Fisher model, Trading post with proportional
updates is equivalent to gradient descent (with respect to the Bregman divergence instead of
the Euclidean distance) [BDX11].
3
Figure 2: Cycling behavior in the bids for the
two-producer economy ~a = [[1, 5], [0.2, 1]].
The initial amounts are (1, 1) and budgets
(25, 100). The bids of producer 1 are shown
in red and blue and those of producer 2 in
green and orange. The period is 3.
Figure 3: Gini index computed for the quan-
tities after 800 rounds, for the two producer
economy ~a = [[
√
1.5, 0.1], [15,
√
1.5]]. The
initial amounts are (1, 1) and initial budgets
(1, 1). The value x on the X axis shows the
initial bid of producer 1 on 2 (producer 1
starts by bidding the remainder of 1 − x on
its own good), and Y axis value the initial
bid of producer 2 on good 1.
The combination of these two rules results in rather interesting dynamics, even when we
only have two producers as in the example above. Figure 1 presents simulations results of this
dynamic of the two-producer example above (from some simple starting amounts). Note that
while the system seems to oscillate in a rather irregular fashion, one can clearly see the quantities
produced are growing over time. The budgets of the players also oscillate in an unclear pattern.
Figure 2 shows in greater detail the oscillations in a simulation of another two-producer market
where growth is not achieved but instead a repeated oscillation with period 3 (!) is.
Our first main result is that Trading post with proportional updates is indeed a universal
mechanism: if a production economy can grow unboundedly using an optimal (possibly central-
ized) allocation rule, the economy also grows unboundedly by following this mechanism.2
Theorem 1 (Universal growth). Trading posts with proportional updates is a universal mech-
anism.
We further study the properties of this mechanism, for example showing that its rate of
growth is as fast as possible. Our proof analyzes the volumes of cycles in the resulting dynamical
system and shows that on each cycle the volume expands or shrinks by a constant factor in each
round, which implies the asymptotically optimal rate of growth of the economy.
Our results also show that the players learn a global feature (the optimal cycle) on the
network while only interacting locally with their direct neighbors. The information flows along
the edges in such a way that in the limit the dynamic learns implicitly the best production
cycles.
We also focus on the level of inequality between the different producers that develops as
the market grows. Figure 3 depicts a heat map of the Gini index (a measure of inequality)
reached in a certain two producer economy (after 800 rounds) as a function of the initial bids.
Despite the complexity of the dynamics we are able to show that our mechanism always leads
to growing inequality between the producers, in terms of the quantity of goods that they get as
time progresses. Specifically, we have the following inequality theorem:
2In other words, the performance of a universal mechanism is not too far from that of an optimal centralized
allocation rule.
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Theorem 2 (Inequality). The producers get differentiated over time into two classes: the
“rich”, who participate in the “most efficient production cycle” versus the “poor”, who do not.
While the inequality gaps within the “max-efficiency” class remain bounded by a constant, the
inequality gap between this class and the rest grows to infinity.
We obtain the theorem by establishing that as time progresses producers of the “max-
efficiency” class trade more and more among themselves, and their production is more efficient
than that of any other group of producers.
We find several other phenomena, such as the fact that other producers, who are not part of
the “max-efficiency” class, can also grow. In fact, a producer can grow even if he is not part of
any efficient production cycle, if he is instead “well-networked”. For this we show the existence
of phase transitions in the long term quantity of a producer depending on the quality of his
connections.
1.3 Open Problems
We believe that we have only started scratching the surface of understanding the dynamics of
decentralized models of economic growth and open problems abound. First, there are a bunch
of questions that we are not able to answer in our specific model. For example, we would like
to characterize the set of players that obtain increasing amount of goods versus those that get
vanishing amounts over time.
Second, we feel that we have only a very partial understanding of the class of mechanisms
that can be utilized. E.g., to what extent are the results that we obtained peculiar to the
specific rules that we chose (trading posts and proportional bids)? Which other types of rules
will provide similar performance (or better in some sense such as less inequality)? Our work is
part of a larger literature on learning how to bid in auctions and markets, and so a question
is what mechanisms have good performance when players are learning how to participate in a
market or game and adapting their behavior based on past performance.
Third, considering additive production functions can obviously only be considered as a first
step to understanding wider and more realistic classes of production functions. At a higher level
yet, we believe that our whole framework is only a first step, and improved modeling (as well
as connection to existing macro-economic models) is interesting.
1.4 Related Work
Analysis of markets (economies) is central to economics. The growth model due to von Neuman
[vN46] for production economies has been extensively studied, e.g., see [KMT56, Pas62, HM65,
Lan12], however mainly to understand the growth rate of the economy at equilibrium and under
Leontief-type production functions. The classical Arrow-Debreu market model which involves
both production and consumption has been studied for its equilibrium properties [AD54], and
within CS for their computation and complexity [DPSV08, Orl10, Ve´g12, CSVY06, CDDT09b,
EY10, GMVY17].
The question of how the equilibrium prices are reached is analyzed under the natural price
adjustment process due to Walras [Wal74], called Tatonnement – increase the prices of over
demanded goods and decrease for the under demanded goods. In particular, [AH58, ABH59,
AH60] showed that it converges to an equilibrium in markets with valuations restricted to the
weak-gross-substitutes (WGS) property. The work within CS showed fast convergence of specific
Tatonmment rules for WGS [CF08, CMV05, CPV05] as well as a class of non-WGS markets
[CCD13]. All of these results focus on static markets where goods/money endowments of agents
remain fixed. For such a static model, [WZ07, Zha11] studies proportional response dynamics
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with trading post mechanism, showing fast convergence to a market equilibrium for a large
class of valuations known as constant elasticity of substitution. On the contrary, our model
is inherently dynamic, where amounts of both money and goods of an agent change based on
the trade and production that happened in the previous round. Questions of growth exist in
macroeconomics as well [Sol56, S.56, Uri13, Ace09] where the focus is on technical progress, i.e.,
capital accumulation, population growth, etc., and typically uses Cobb-Douglas type production
functions.
Like in our model, a recent work on trading networks due to [Jag17] also studies trades along
edges of an underlying graph, where firms trade contracts consisting of exchange, production
and pricing. However, again the focus is on equilibrium existence, which is obtained when the
underlying graph is a tree.
There has been extensive work on understanding dynamics in games and auctions under
various behavioural model of agents, such as best-response, multiplicative weight update, no
regret learning (e.g., [FS99, KPT09, DDK15, MPP15, PP16a, RST17, DS16, MT12, HKMN11,
BR11, LB10, NSVZ11, BBN17, PP16b, LST16, CD11, DK17, CDE+14]). In the former the focus
has been on convergence to an equilibrium, preferable Nash, and if not then (coarse) correlated
equilibria, and the rate of covergence. In the latter the focus has been on either convergence
points and their quality (price-of-anarchy), or dynamic mechanism such as ascending price
auction to reach a solution (such as the Ausubel auction [Aus04]). Also, the Trading post
mechanism has been studied in other scenarios, such as rent seeking, allocating computational
resources, matching markets, and fairness [ILWM17, BGM17, FLZ09, Tul80].
Study of evolution naturally involves dynamics at the level of genes or species (e.g., see
[Lot10, Vol28, GMM71, Wan78, HS98, LA83, CLPV14, MPP15]). The Lotka-Volterra model
[Lot10, Vol28, Wan78] studies interdependence of animals and how they “help” or “destroy”
each other based on their interactions and reproduction. There seems a high-level similarity
between this model and ours, but the former may be thought of as a mechanism with a fixed
splitting rule in our setting.
Organization. Section 2 formalizes our market model and class of mechanisms. The propor-
tional response dynamic is defined in Section 3, and in Section 4 we analyze the growth under
it and show that it is a universal mechanism. Section 5 analyzes inequality, while Sections 6
and 7 further characterizes its various properties. We conclude with Gini index simulations in
Section 8.
2 Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players. Each player i can make an eponymous good 3 using the
recipe given by his additive production function described by ~ai = (ai,1, . . . , ai,n), where ai,j ≥ 0
is the amount made by player i from one unit of good j. The player knows his own function.
A bundle of goods is a vector ~y = (y1, . . . , yn), where yj ≥ 0 is the amount of good j. Given a
bundle ~y, player i makes from it an amount pi(~y) =
∑n
j=1 ai,j · yj of his good.
A production economy operates over time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. At every time unit t, each
player i produces an amount xi(t) of his good (from the bundle of ingredients he owns), then
trades the good at the market. The bundle obtained by the player from trade at time t is the
input to his production at time t + 1. We will assume that each player i starts at t = 0 by
having an initial amount xi(0) > 0 of his good that he directly enters trade with.
3In other words, each player i makes good i; no other player can make good i and player i only knows how to
make this type of good.
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We will assume the economy (i.e. digraph ~a) is strongly connected.
2.1 Mechanisms
For the activity in the economy to be completely specified, we must state what mechanism is
used for trade.
Definition 1 (Abstract Mechanism). A market mechanism specifies how trade takes place in
each round and is defined as an infinite sequence of “splitting rules” β(t)t≥0, such that βi,j(t) ≥ 0
is the fraction received by player i from good j in round t and
∑n
k=1 βk,j(t) ≤ 1.
Our interest is in mechanisms where the βi,j(t)’s are determined by player i locally from
information that he has in time t, and such local mechanisms will additionally include a com-
munication protocol specifying the communication between the players. Our main analysis is
for a specific mechanism with natural local decisions (trading posts) and very simple natural
communication (proportional bids).
Our measure for how well the economy is doing at any point in time t will be the total
amount of goods in the economy: X(t) =
∑n
i=1 xi(t).
Definition 2 (Growth and decay). An economy (equipped with some mechanism for trade)
grows if limt→∞X(t) = ∞ and vanishes (or decays) if limt→∞X(t) = 0. Similarly, a player i
grows if limt→∞ xi(t) =∞ and vanishes if limt→∞ xi(t) = 0, respectively.
We are also interested in measuring the inequality in the economy, captured by the Gini
index.
Definition 3 (Gini index). Given a vector ~u = (u1, . . . , un), its Gini index is:
G(~u) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |ui − uj |
2n ·∑ni=1 ui
The Gini index is normalized between 0 and 1 so that 0 means perfect equality and 1
maximum inequality. The latter is achieved when one entry is equal to 1 and all other entries
are zero.
Example 1. Let ~a = [[1.1, 0], [0.2, 0]] be a two player economy with initial amounts xi(0) = 1,
i.e. player 1 can make 1.1 units (of good 1) from one unit of good 1 and zero units from one
unit of good 2, while player 2 can make 0.2 units (of good 2) from one unit of good 1 and zero
units from one unit of good 2. If the mechanism used is to give each player 100% of his own
good in every round, then player 1 will grow while player 2 will vanish. If on the other hand the
goods are split equally in every round, both players will vanish.
The calculations are in Appendix A. The high level idea of the example is that player 1 is
“productive” by himself, but not so productive as to support both himself and another player
receiving equal shares througout time.
2.2 Cycles
Important objects in our analysis will be simple cycles. In short a cycle will be a set of
players (i1, . . . , ik, i1), where all the ij ’s are different. For simplicity we will denote this by
C = (i1, . . . , ik) and consider them as an ordered set of nodes. Given such a cycle C, we will
override notation and denote an edge in C by (i, j) ∈ C, meaning that (1) i, j ∈ C and (2) j is
the successor of i in the ordering (i1, . . . , ik, i1), simply saying that we consider how useful good
i is for player j.
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Definition 4 (Good and bad cycle). A cycle C in the digraph ~a is good if the product of
weights along the cycle is strictly greater than one (i.e.
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j > 1) and bad if the product
is strictly less than one.
Definition 5 (Best cycle). A cycle C in the digraph ~a is the best cycle if its geometric mean
is the highest among all the cycles.
2.3 General Mechanisms
We first observe that if all the cycles in the weighted directed graph induced by the values
ai,j are “good”, then every non-wasteful mechanism will lead to growth, while if all the cycles
are “bad”, no mechanism can save the economy from shrinking to zero in the limit. Note an
economy is strongly connected if the directed graph with nodes N and weights ~a is so.
Proposition 1. An economy vanishes with any mechanism if and only if all the cycles are bad.
A mechanism β(t)t≥0 is non-wasteful if it never throws away goods (i.e.
∑n
i=1 βi,j(t) = 1
for all j, t) or allocates goods to players that do not need them (i.e. if ai,j = 0 then βi,j(t) = 0
for all i, j, t).
Proposition 2. A strongly connected economy grows with any non-wasteful mechanism if and
only if (i) it has least one good cycle and (ii) each directed cycle is either good or has zero edges
all along.
For an economy with additive production to grow, there must exist at least one good cycle,
say C. Moreover, there exists a mechanism that can grow such an economy by having the
players along C send their good to their successor in C. This gives the next statement.
Proposition 3. A strongly connected economy grows with some non-wasteful mechanism if and
only if it has at least one good cycle.
In our model, a universal mechanism will enable growth precisely when the economy has at
least one good cycle.
Definition 6. A mechanism M is called universal if for any economy with additive production
that has at least one good cycle, the economy grows by using the splitting rule given by M.
3 Trading Post
From now on we focus on studying the Trading post mechanism. Each player i will be initially
endowed with some amount of artificial currency it can use to acquire goods that they like. In a
round, every player runs a contest to decide how to allocate its good. The players submit bids
on the goods they are interested in buying, after which every good j is allocated in fractions
proportional to the bids. Thus if the bids in some round are bk,`, for all k, ` ∈ N , then player i
receives the following fraction of good j:
fi,j =
{
bi,j∑n
k=1 bk,j
if bi,j > 0
0 otherwise
Each player collects the money made from selling his good, and this money will be his budget
in the next round.
We will analyze Trading post when the players update their bids in proportion to the con-
tribution of each good in the production from last round. This corresponds to the proportional
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response dynamic, which has been studied before in Fisher markets; we generalize its definition
to capture exchange settings, where all the players buy and sell. Formally, we have the following
dynamical system.
Definition 7 (Proportional dynamic). The initial amount of each good i is xi(0) and the
initial bids of player i are bi,j(0), which sum up to an initial budget of Bi(0). At each time t,
the following steps take place:
• Exchange of goods. Every player i brings an amount xi(t) of good i and money Bi(t),
which is split into bids bi,j(t). Then player i receives an amount yi,j(t) of each good j,
where
yi,j(t) =
{ (
bi,j(t)∑n
k=1 bk,j(t)
)
· xj(t), if bi,j(t) > 0
0, otherwise
• Production. After trade, each player i produces its good from the bundle purchased,
where the amount is
xi(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
ai,j · yi,j(t).
• Bid update. Each player collects the money made from selling: Bi(t+1) =
∑n
k=1 bk,i(t),
and updates his bids proportionally to the contribution of each good in production 4:
bi,j(t+ 1) =
(
ai,j · yi,j(t)
xi(t+ 1)
)
·Bi(t+ 1)
For the purpose of our results, we can w.l.o.g. normalize the money in the economy so
that
∑n
i,j=1 bi,j(0) = 1. We will also assume the starting configuration is non-degenerate: (a)
xi(0) > 0 and (b) the players bid on goods worth something to them, so bi,j(0) > 0 ⇐⇒ ai,j > 0.
4 Growth
Our first main result is that the trading post mechanism with proportional updates leads to
growth of the economy (whenever growth is possible). We establish this by analyzing the
volumes of on cycles and showing they expand by a constant factor in each round for every
good cycle.
We additionally show that all the players on the best cycle are guaranteed to grow (if that
cycle is good), and in fact their growth is within a constant factor of the optimal growth (that
could be achieved under some optimal allocation of resources in every round, where the constant
may depend on n). Players with good self-loops and players on “good enough” cycles will also
grow infinitely.
Theorem 3 (Universal growth). Trading post with proportional updates is a universal mecha-
nism.
Proof. The high level idea is to consider the volume of cycles as follows. Let ~x(0) and ~b(0) be
any starting quantities and bids with the property that xi(0) > 0 for all i and bi,j(0) > 0 for all
4The bid fractions are unchanged if no production took place. This will turn out to not matter however since
we will study non-degenerate starting states, which will imply that throughout time every player will be able to
produce a non-zero (but possibly very small) amount.
9
i, j where ai,j > 0. Let C be any good cycle and denote by α =
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j > 1 the product
along C. Take the product of all the quantities and bids on C, given by the function
F (t) =
∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t) · xi(t), for all t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞
Since the starting state is non-degenerate, F (0) =
∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(0) ·xi(0) > 0. Rewriting the bids
at time t+ 1 as a function of the quantities and bids at time t, we obtain
F (t+ 1) =
∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t+ 1) · xi(t+ 1)
=
 ∏
(i,j)∈C
ai,j · yi,j(t)
xi(t+ 1)
·Bi(t+ 1)
(∏
i∈C
xi(t+ 1)
)
=
∏
(i,j)∈C
(ai,j · yi,j(t) ·Bi(t+ 1))
=
∏
(i,j)∈C
(
ai,j ·
(
bi,j(t)∑n
k=1 bk,j(t)
)
· xj(t) ·Bi(t+ 1)
)
=
∏
(i,j)∈C
(
ai,j ·
(
bi,j(t)
Bj(t+ 1)
)
· xj(t) ·Bi(t+ 1)
)
=
∏
(i,j)∈C
(ai,j · bi,j(t) · xj(t))
=
 ∏
(i,j)∈C
ai,j
 ∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t) · xj(t)

= α · F (t)
It follows by induction that F (t) = αt · F (0), for all t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. Since α > 1, we have
limt→∞ F (t) =∞. The total amount of money is 1, so bi,j(t) ≤ 1 for all i, j, t, thus
∏
i∈C xi(t) ≥
F (t). Let ` denote the length of C. From the geometric-arithmetic mean, we have∑
i∈C
xi(t) ≥ ` ·
√`∏
i∈C
xi(t) ≥ ` ·
√`
F (t).
Then limt→∞
∑
i∈C xi(t) = ∞, so for every good cycle, the sum of quantities of the players
along the cycle grows infinitely.
A simulation for two players can be found in Figure 4, showing how the amounts, budgets,
fractions invested by the players on each other, and the Gini coefficient evolve over time in an
economy where the only good cycle contains both players. In Figure 4(c) it can be seen that
each player spends 100% of his money on buying the good of the other player. Figure 4(f) shows
the Gini coefficient in terms of the amounts, which oscillates for the whole duration of the time
simulated, and Figure 4(g) the Gini coefficient in terms of budgets, which eventually reaches a
stable point.
Next we study the question of which players grow in the limit.
Corollary 1. Each player with a good self-loop grows.
Proof. Let i be any player for which ai,i > 1. By Theorem 3, F (t) = bi,i(t) · xi(t) = ati,i · F (0).
We have xi(t) ≥ bi,i(t) · xi(t) and limt→∞ F (t) =∞, so limt→∞ xi(t) =∞ as required.
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(a) Two player economy. (b) Amounts over time
(c) For each player, fraction of his budget that
he invests on the other player
(d) Budget of player 1
(e) Budget of player 2 (f) Gini coefficient: amounts
(g) Gini coefficient: budgets
Figure 4: Two-player economy ~a = [[0.99, 0.1], [10.2, 0.99]]. The X axis shows time (number of
rounds) and Y axis the variable plotted. Player 1 is marked with blue and player 2 with orange.
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Corollary 2. In economies where all the cycles are good, every player grows.
Proof. If all the cycles are good, each self-loop is good. By Corollary 1, each player grows.
Lemma 1. Let C be one of the best cycles. Then there exists a constant ζ > 0 such that for
each player i ∈ N and time t, xi(t) < ζ · αt/|C|, where α =
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j is the product along C.
Proof. From Theorem 3, we obtain a function F with the property: F (t) =
∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(t) ·
xi(t) = α
t · F (0), where F (0) > 0 since the starting configuration is non-degenerate. Let
k = |C|.
The maximum growth given a number of rounds divisible by k can be achieved by passing
as much flow as possible through one of the best cycles, so for any player i ∈ N and any t ∈ N,
xi(kt) <
 n∑
j=1
xj
 · α k·tk =
 n∑
j=1
xj
 · αt
Then for any time t = kt′ + r with 0 ≤ r < k, we have the following bound, where ∆ =
max(`1,`2) a`1,`2 is the maximum edge in the graph and ζ =
(∑n
j=1 xj
)
·max{1,∆r}/min{1, αr/k}
is a constant, dependent on the graph and the starting configuration, but independent of time:
xi(t) <
 n∑
j=1
xj
 ·αt′ ·∆r =
 n∑
j=1
xj
 ·αt/k · ∆r
αt/k−t′
<
 n∑
j=1
xj
 ·αt/k · max{1,∆r}
min{1, αr/k} = α
t/k · ζ
This completes the bound.
Lemma 2. Let C be one of the best cycles. Then there exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all
t ∈ N, the bids along the cycle are bounded from below by δ; that is, bi,j(t) > δ for all (i, j) ∈ C.
Proof. By Lemma 1, there exists a constant ζ˜ > 0 such that for each player i ∈ N and time t,
the following inequality holds: xi(t) < ζ˜ ·αt/k, where α =
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j and k = |C| is the length
of cycle C. Let ζ = ζ˜k. Then ∏
i∈C
xi(t) <
∏
i∈C
ζ˜k · (αt/k)k = ζ · αt (1)
Combining the expression for F (t) with inequality (1) we get:
F (t) = αt · F (0) =
∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t) · xi(t) =
 ∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t)
 · [∏
i∈C
xi(t)
]
<
 ∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t)
 · αt · ζ.
Recall that F (0) > 0, bi,j(t) < 1 for all i, j, t. Set δ = F (0)/ζ > 0. Then the product of bids
along C is ∏
(i,j)∈C
bi,j(t) >
αt · F (0)
αt · ζ = δ.
Since bi,j(t) < 1 for all i, j ∈ N , the bid of player i on good j, where (i, j) ∈ C, is at least:
bi,j(t) > δ/
 ∏
(`,`′)∈C\(i,j)
b`,`′(t)
 > δ,
for all t ∈ N. Thus the bids along C are bounded from below by a constant throughout time.
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The amounts of the players on the best cycle will turn out to be within a constant factor of
the optimal throughout time (where the optimal amounts are those that could be achieved by
a central planner by ensuring trade only happens on the best cycle in each round).
Proposition 4 (Optimal rate of growth). Let C be one of the best cycles and k its length. Then
there exist constants γ, ζ > 0 such that for each player i ∈ C and time t, γ ·αt/k < xi(t) < ζ ·αt/k,
where α =
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j is the product along C.
Proof. Define sequences y(t) = maxi∈C xi(t) and z(t) = mini∈C xi(t) containing the maximum
and minimum amounts, respectively, on the cycle C at each time t. By Theorem 3, there is a
function F with the property that F (t) =
∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(t) · xi(t) = αt ·F (0). By Lemma 1, there
is a constant ζ > 0 such that for each i ∈ C and time t ∈ N, xi(t) < α tk · ζ, so y(t) < α tk · ζ. Let
`t ∈ C be the player on the cycle with minimum amount at t, breaking ties lexicographically,
and γ = F (0)/ζk > 0 a constant. Then
z(t) =
∏
i∈C xi(t)∏
i∈C\{`t} xi(t)
=
αt · F (0)∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(t)
· 1∏
i∈C\{`t} xi(t)
>
αt · F (0)∏
i∈C\{`t} α
t
k · ζ
=
αt · F (0)
ζk−1 · α (k−1)tk
= αt/k · γ,
where γ = F (0)/ζk−1. Then for any i ∈ C and time t, we get that γ · αt/k < z(t) ≤ xi(t) ≤
y(t) < αt/k · ζ as required.
Corollary 3 (Rate of growth of the economy). There exists constant c > 0 (possibly dependent
on ~a but independent of time), such that
X(t) ≥ c ·XOPT (t) for all t
where XOPT (t) is the highest total amount that could be achieved by any (possibly centralized)
mechanism at time t.
Proposition 5 (Growth of players on the best cycles). Suppose an economy has at least one
good cycle. Then for each of the best cycles C, all the players in C grow.
Proof. By Proposition 4, there exist constants γ, ζ > 0 such that for any best cycle C and any
player i ∈ C, γ · αt/k < xi(t) < ζ · αt/k, where α =
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j . Since α > 1, it follows that
limt→∞ xi(t) =∞ as required.
The bounds on growth of Proposition 4 imply that growth can be achieved also by players
outside the best cycle, even if such players don’t have good self loops, as long as they are part
of a “good enough” cycle.
Proposition 6 (Growth of players on “good enough” cycles). Suppose an economy has at least
one good cycle and let C be one of the best cycles. Then all players on any cycle C ′ with
α′ > (α)
|C′|−1
|C| grow, where α =
∏
(i,j)∈C ai,j and α
′ =
∏
(i,j)∈C′ ai,j are the product on C and
C ′, respectively.
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Proof. Let k = |C| and ` = |C ′|. By Lemma 1, there exists ζ > 0 such that for each i ∈ N ,
xi(t) < ζ · αt/k for all t ∈ N. By Theorem 3, we have that
∏
(k,j)∈C′ bk,j(t) · xk(t) = (α′)t · c, for
a fixed c > 0. Then for any player i ∈ C ′, we have
xi(t) =
(α′)t · c(∏
(k,j)∈C′ bk,j(t)
)
·
(∏
k∈C′\{i} xk(t)
)
>
(α′)t · c∏
k∈C′\{i} ζ · αt/k
= ζ1−` · (α
′)t · c(
αt/k
)`−1
= c · ζ1−` ·
(
α′
α
`−1
k
)t
From the condition that α′ > α
|C′|−1
|C| , we get that limt→∞ xi(t) =∞ as required.
We leave open the question of understanding more precisely which players grow and, in
particular, whether all the players situated on a good cycle are guaranteed to grow.
Open Problem 1. Are all the players on a good cycle guaranteed to grow?
5 Inequality
In this section we assume the best cycle is unique. We show that the players will get split
into two classes: the “rich” (who will turn out to be the players on the best cycle) and the
“poor” (everyone else), such that the inequality between these classes will diverge to infinity.
The “poor” players will be poor when compared to rich, but some (or even all) of them may
grow too, just at a slower rate.
En route to proving the inequality theorem we establish several other statements: (1) in the
limit the players on the best cycle will bid 100% of their budget on their predecessor on the
cycle and (2) in the limit there is no flow of money between the players on the best cycle and
rest. We conjecture that in fact the best cycle absorbs all the money in the limit.
We obtain the existence of a limit vector of money (budgets) so that the players on the best
cycle rotate these budgets among themselves throughout time. For amounts we get periodicity
in a normalized version of the economy, which will imply that the Gini index for amounts cycles
with period k, where k is the length of the best cycle.
Lemma 3. Consider an economy with a unique best cycle C that is run on a sequence of
arbitrary splitting rules β(t), such that βk,`(t) is the fraction received by player k from good `
in round t for each k, `. Suppose α(C) = 1 and for all other cycles C ′ 6= C, α(C ′) ≤ (1 − )
for some  > 0. If there exists an edge (j, i) ∈ C, where j preceeds i, such that player i receives
infinitely often less than a γ fraction from the good of player j for some 0 ≤ γ < 1, then there
is a subsequence of rounds where the amount received by player i from j goes to zero.
Proof. The product of ai,js on cycle C is exactly one, and it is at most (1−) on any other cycle.
Intuitively any amount that passes through C maintains its quantity, while the ones passing
through any other cycle get reduced by at least a multiplicative factor of (1 − ). Assume
without loss of generality that xi(0) ≤ 1 for all players i, where xj(t) is the amount (of good j)
produced by player j at time t. Denote by q(t) the amount of good j received by player i.
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Using the above intuition, we will show that as t → ∞, either there is a subsequence of
rounds t1, . . . , tk, . . . such that limk→∞ xj(tk) = 0 and thereby limk→∞ q(tk) = 0, or the total
amount in the system goes to zero.
Define D =
∏
(k,`):ak,`>1
ak,` and let the total initial amount be Q =
∑n
k=1 xk(0). Consider
a self-intersecting path P of arbitrary length. It consists of a set of cycles and non-overlapping
segments. The total length of non-overlapping segments can be at most n and the product of
their ai,js can be at most D. Therefore, the product of ai,js on this path is at most D(1− )k
where k is the number of bad cycles other than C in the path P . Thus any quantity can get a
boost of (at most) D at most once throughout time.
Recall that at every time t, the fraction of good ` that player k gets is denoted by βk,`(t).
We will say that a split at time t is a bad split if βi,j(t) ≤ γ. Let t1 be the first round when a
bad split happens. Thus only q(t1) ≤ γxj(t1) remains on the good cycle after t1. The remaining
amount (1−γ)xj(t1) goes through some bad cycles and within the next n rounds gets multiplied
by (1− ) (or less). In addition to completion of a bad cycle the amount may travel through a
segment of good edges, but the overall increase due to this is at most D. Counting this one time
boost a priori for all of Q, the total amount after (t1 + n) rounds can be bounded as follows:
n∑
`=1
x`(t1 + n) ≤ (D ·Q− xj(t1)) + xj(t1)(γ + (1− )(1− γ))
= D ·Q− (1− γ)xj(t1)
Given that all the cycles are less than equal to one and we already factored in any temporary
boost that the total amount could receive, the bound at time n+t1 on the total amount continues
to hold for all times t′ ≥ n+ t1, that is
n∑
`=1
x`(t
′) ≤ D ·Q− (1− γ)xj(t1) (2)
Now suppose the first bad split after (n+ t1) rounds happen at time t2. By using a similar
argument to the one for inequality (2) and invoking inequality (2), we get that after (n + t2)
rounds the total amount in the system can be at most
n∑
`=1
x`(t2 + n) ≤ (D ·Q− (1− γ)xj(t1)− xj(t2)) + xj(t2)(γ + (1− )(1− γ))
= D ·Q− (1− γ) (xj(t1) + xj(t2))
Thus after every bad split that we consider, we will ignore n rounds. Let us call any such
bad split that we consider with the gap of n rounds a counted bad split. Applying the above
argument inductively, we get that if first (k − 1) counted bad splits have occurred at rounds
t1, . . . , t(k−1), and the kth happens in round tk, then after (tk + n) rounds the total amount of
all goods is bounded by:
n∑
`=1
x`(tk + n) ≤ D ·Q− (1− γ)
(
k∑
d=1
xj(td)
)
Since there are infinitely many bad splits, and for every counted bad split we ignore at most
n bad splits, the counted bad splits are also infinitely many. Suppose that these occur at the
time sequence t1, t2, . . . . Then as k → ∞ either xj(tk) → 0 or the total amount goes to zero.
In either case q(tk) goes to zero as required.
15
The above lemma is in fact optimal, in the sense that picking a subsequence of rounds is
important. Neither the total amount itself nor the quantity received by i from j need to go to
zero as demonstrated by the construction in the next example.
Example 2. Consider an economy with five agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The best cycle is among
players 1, 2, 3, with a2,1 = a3,2 = a1,3 = 1, and there is another cycle among players 1, 4, 5, with
a4,1 = a1,5 = 1 and a5,4 = 1 −  for some 0 <  < 1. Let the initial amount of each goods
with agents 1, 2, and 3 be one, and that of 4 and 5 be zero(note the statement can be made for
non-zero but very small amounts too, but the calculations are simpler for zero so we illustrate
this scenario). Consider the following infinite sequence of splitting rules.
Starting from the first round, suppose agent 1 splits her good between agents 2 and 4 in γ
and (1 − γ) fraction respectively after every three rounds. In other words β2,1(1 + 3k) = γ for
all k = 0, 1, ..., and for the rest of the rounds β2,1(t) = 1. For all other agents, there is only one
successor and hence no splitting. It is easy to see that the amount of good produced by agent 1
in time t, call it x1(t) is,
x1(t) = (γ + (1− γ)(1− ))k If t = 3k for an integer k ≥ 0
= 1 Otherwise.
Thus neither total quantity nor the amount received by agent 2 from agent 1 goes to zero. But,
a subsequence of xj(t), namely t = 3k for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , goes to zero.
Observation 1. Suppose C is the unique best cycle. Then there are economies where some
of the players outside C invest 0% of their budget on the goods in C as t → ∞. We find
this phenomenon by simulating the following economy: a = [[0.1, 1, 0.1, 0.1], [1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1],
[0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3], [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1]], with budgets and amounts initialized to 1 and bi,j = 1/3 for
all i 6= j. The best cycle is C = (1, 2). In Figure 5 it can be seen that in the limit player 3
invests 100% of its budget on player 4, even though the amount of player 4 goes to zero. Also
note that the budgets of players 3 and 4 converge to zero.
(a) Four player economy. The
best cycle is (1, 2).
(b) Budgets. Players 1, 2 are shown in
blue.
Figure 5: Four player economy where some players outside the best cycle (namely player 3)
invest 0% of their budget on the cycle (in the limit), with budgets and amounts initialized to 1
and bi,j = 1/3 for all i 6= j.
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(a) Fractions invested by 3 on players
1, 2, 4. The fraction invested on player
4 is in blue. In the limit, player 3 invests
100% of his budget on player 4.
(b) Fraction invested by player 4 on 1.
(c) Fraction invested by player 4 on 2. (d) Fraction invested by player 4 on 3.
Figure 6: In the economy from Figure 5, the fraction of its budget that each player invests on
the goods.
Lemma 4. Consider any economy ~a running trading post with proportional updates. Then
there exists w > 0 such that by dividing each edge of ~a by w, we obtain a normalized economy
~a′ in which any best cycle has product exactly 1, all the other cycles have product strictly less
than 1, and at any round t
• the bids of the players in ~a and ~a′ are identical (i.e. b′i,j(t) = bi,j(t) for all i, j).
• the amount of any player i in ~a′ is equal to its amount in ~a divided by wt (i.e. x′i(t) =
xi(t)/w
t).
Proof. Let ai,j be the edges of ~a and C any best cycle. Denote by k and w the length and
geometric mean of C, respectively. Consider the economy ~a′ with edges a′i,j = ai,j/w for all i, j.
Then in ~a′ the cycle C will have geometric mean 1. For any other cycle C ′ with length ` and
product α(C ′) =
∏
(i,j)∈C′ ai,j , its geometric mean in the scaled graph will be√` ∏
(i,j)∈C′
ai,j
w
=
√`
α(C)
w`
=
√`
α(C)
w
Thus if the geometric mean of the cycle C ′,
√`
α(C), is also w, then in the scaled graph C ′ will
have mean and product exactly 1, and otherwise C ′ will have mean and product strictly less
than 1. Let ~b(t) and ~x(t) be the initial (non-degenerate) starting state of economy ~a. Denote by
~b′(t) and ~x′(t) the bids and amounts at time t in the scaled economy ~a′ such that ~b′(0) = ~b(0)
and ~x′(0) = ~x(0). Since b′i,j(0) = bi,j(0), the fractions of the goods received by each player in
the first round are the same in the two economies:
f ′i,j(0) =
b′i,j(0)∑n
k=1 b
′
k,j(0)
=
bi,j(0)∑n
k=1 bk,j(0)
= fi,j(0)
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After one round of updates, the amounts in ~a′ will be
x′i(1) =
n∑
j=1
f ′i,j · a′i,j · x′j(0) =
n∑
j=1
fi,j · ai,j
w
· xj(0) = xi(0)
w
The updated budgets are B′i(1) =
∑n
j=1 b
′
j,i(0) =
∑n
j=1 bj,i(0) = Bi(1), while the new bids are
b′i,j(1) =
(
f ′i,j · a′i,j · x′j(0)∑n
k=1 f
′
i,k · a′i,k · x′k(0)
)
·B′i(1)
=
(
fi,j · ai,jw · xj(0)∑n
k=1 fi,k · ai,kw · xk(0)
)
·Bi(1)
=
(
fi,j · ai,j · xj(0)∑n
k=1 fi,k · ai,k · xk(0)
)
·Bi(1)
= bi,j(1)
With a simple inductive argument, we obtain that b′i,j(t) = bi,j(t) and x
′
i(t) =
xi(t)
wt for all players
i, j and round t, as required.
We refer to the unique value w in Lemma 4 as the normalization coefficient of the economy.
Proposition 7. Suppose the best cycle, C, is unique. Then in the limit the fraction received by
each player in C from the good of its predecessor in C converges to 100%.
Proof. By Lemma 4, we can assume that the best cycle, C, has product one, while all the other
cycles have product less than 1− , for some  > 0. Let i ∈ C and denote by j the predecessor
of player i in C. Suppose towards a contradiction that the fraction received by player i from
good j does not converge to 1 in the limit. Then there is a constant γ < 1 such that infinitely
often, player i receives less than a γ fraction from good j. By Lemma 3, it follows that there
is a subsequence of rounds for which player i receives in the limit of t→∞ an amount of zero
from good j.
However by Lemma 2, player i bids at least δ on good j in every round and by Theorem
4, the amount of good j is in an interval bounded away from zero throughout time, that is,
there exist constants β > α > 0 such that xj(t) ∈ [α, β] for all times t. Thus the amount
q(t) received by player i from good j at time t remains bounded away from zero throughout
time. We obtained a contradiction. Thus the assumption must have been false and the fraction
received by player i from player j converges to 1 as t→∞.
Proposition 8. Let C be the unique best cycle. Then in the limit there is no money flowing from
players in C to players in N \ C and viceversa, i.e. limt→∞ bi,j(t) = 0 and limt→∞ bj,i(t) = 0
for all i ∈ C and j 6∈ C.
Proof. By Proposition 7, in the limit each player i ∈ C receives 100% of the good of their
predecessor, say j, in C, which implies that the bids of the other players on good j vanish in
the limit. In particular, in the limit there is no money flowing from N \ C to C.
To show that the bids of the players in C on the goods in N \ C also vanish in the limit,
suppose towards a contradiction that they do not. Then there is a constant φ > 0 such that
some player i ∈ C sends infinitely often a bid of at least bi,j(t) ≥ φ on some player j 6∈ C.
By Lemma 2, there is a constant δ > 0 such that each player in C bids at least δ on their
predecessor in C, which implies that Bk(t) ≥ δ for all players k ∈ C and any time t. Since
the money flowing from N \ C to C vanishes in the limit, but player i sends infinitely often at
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least φ > 0 to player j, it follows that there is a subsequence in the sorted vector of budgets of
players in C that goes to zero, which is a contradiction. Thus the assumption was false and the
money flowing from the players in C to N \ C also vanishes in the limit.
In the limit, the budgets of the players on the best cycle C will converge to some values that
get rotated infinitely often along the cycle (from one player in C to its successor in C).
Corollary 4. Suppose C = (1, . . . , k) is the unique best cycle, where player j uses the good of
player j − 1. There exist values B∗1 , . . . , B∗k such that for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}
lim
t→∞Bi(tk + r) = B
∗
i−r, where any index ` ≤ 0 is interpreted as `+ k
Proof. By Proposition 7 and 8, we get that in the limit each player in C sends all its money
to its predecessor in C. This means there exist values B∗1 . . . B∗k so that in the long term the
budgets of the players are described by these values (with a shift, as the money gets passed
around the cycle). This implies the required limit behavior.
Theorem 4 (Inequality). Suppose an economy has a unique best cycle C. Then in the limit,
the players in C are arbitrarily richer than the rest. That is, for all i ∈ C and j 6∈ C,
lim
t→∞
xi(t)
xj(t)
=∞.
Proof. Since the theorem statement requires measuring only the ratios of the amounts, by
Lemma 4, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the best cycle, C, has product one, while all the other
cycles have product less than 1− , for some  > 0. Let i be any player in C and j any player in
N \C. By Proposition 4, there exist constants γ, ζ > 0 such that γ < xi(t) < ζ for all t ∈ N. By
Proposition 7, the bid of player j on good i vanishes in the limit. We can decompose the good
of player j at time t in two parts: xj(t) = wj(t) + zj(t), where wj(t) is the amount obtained by
bidding on the goods of players in C and zj(t) the amount obtained from players in N \C. Let
s(t) =
∑
j∈N\C xj(t) = w(t) + z(t), where w(t) =
∑
j∈N\C wj(t) and z(t) =
∑
j∈N\C zj(t).
From Proposition 7 it follows that limt→∞wj(t) = 0 for each j ∈ N \C, so limt→∞w(t) = 0.
Thus in the limit the players in N \C only receive goods from other players in N \C. But since
the subgraph induced by N \C has only cycles that are bad (with product less than 1− ), any
amount that completes such a cycle is reduced by at least n
√
1−  < 1 (multiplicatively), which
implies that limt→∞ z(t) = 0 as well. Thus limt→∞ xj(t) = 0 for each player j ∈ N \C. On the
other hand xi(t) > γ > 0, so limt→∞ xi(t)/xj(t) =∞ as required.
In our simulation we observed that the best cycle always absorbed all the money in the
limit, and if there were multiple best cycles, they absorbed all the money collectively.
Open Problem 2 (Concentration of money). Do the best cycles absorb all the money in the
limit? That is, in an economy with best cycles C1 . . . Ck, is it the case that
lim
t→∞
∑
i∈C1∪...∪Ck
Bi(t) = 1
A natural property that one may try to use towards settling Open Problem 2 this is that
the players outside the best cycle spend a non-negligible fraction (i.e. bounded from below by a
constant γ > 0) of their budget on the best cycle throughout time. The simulation for the four
player economy a = [[0.1, 1, 0.1, 0.1], [1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1], [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3], [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1]] shows
that this property is likely to be false; see Note 1 in Appendix ??. However, it can be observed
that the best cycle still absorbs all the money through a different mechanism: player 4 bids a
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non-negligible amount of his budget on the best cycle at all times, and player 3 bids in the limit
100% of his budget on player 4.
We can characterize in some sense the behavior of the amounts in the long run: in the
normalized economy the players on the best cycle will “rotate” a vector of amounts among
themselves (except the rotation is imperfect, it is multiplied by the prefix given by the position
of the current round in the cycle), while the amounts of the players outside the best cycle
converge to zero (the latter is immediate from the inequality theorem).
Corollary 5. Let ~a be any economy with a unique best cycle C = (1, . . . , k), where player j
uses the good of player j − 1. Let w be the normalization coefficient 5 of ~a. There exist values
x∗1, . . . , x∗k such that for each player i ∈ C
1. limt→∞
xi(tk)
wtk
= x∗i
2. for each r ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}, limt→∞ xi(tk+r)wtk+r =
x∗i−r
wr ·
(∏i−1
j=i−r aj+1,j
)
, where any index ` ≤
0 is interpreted as `+ k.
For each player i ∈ N \ C, limt→∞ xi(t)wt = 0.
Proof. Let ~a′ be the normalized economy, with edges a′i,j = ai,j/w. By Proposition 7 and 8,
we get that in the limit in the normalized economy each player in C receives everything from
its predecessor in C and a vanishing amount from N \C. By Corollary 4, there exists a vector
of budgets B∗1 . . . B∗k that in the limit get rotated among the players in C. It follows that the
amounts will be rotated similarly, with the caveat that the amounts will be multiplied by a
prefix of the coefficients a′`,`−1 contained between the index of the player i considered and i− r,
where r ≡ t ( mod k) is the shift. To get property 2 required in the statement from the amounts
of players in ~a, multiply the amounts in ~a′ by a term equal to wt in each round t. The limit
behavior of the amounts of the players in N \ C holds by Theorem 4.
The next statement follows by Corollary 5.
Corollary 6. Suppose an economy has a unique best cycle C = (1, . . . , k). Then the Gini index
for amounts cycles with period k.
We conjecture the Gini index for budgets converges as the best cycle will absorb all the
money in the limit.
Open Problem 3. What happens with the Gini index for amounts when there are multiple
good cycles? Does the Gini index in terms of budgets converge when the best cycle is unique?
6 Phase Transitions
In this section we show the existence of phase transitions, finding that it is possible for a player
to grow even if he is not part of any good (simple) cycle, as long as he is networked “well-
enough”. Our main theorem investigating this phenomenon is for star networks, where a star
is a configuration with players 1 . . . n, such that player n is the center and trades with everyone
else, while the other players only trade with player n. Formally, an,i, ai,n > 0, for all i < n,
while all other ai,j = 0.
5Such that by dividing all the edges of ~a by w, we obtain an economy ~a′ in which the best cycle has product
1 and all the other cycles have product less than 1.
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Theorem 5 (Phase transitions for stars). Consider a star economy with n players and at least
one good cycle, such that player n is the center. Let αi = ai,n · an,i be the product on the cycle
between player i and player n and α∗ = maxn−1i=1 αi the product of the best cycle. Then for any
player i = 1 . . . n− 1, its amount
• grows if αi > 1/
√
α∗.
• vanishes if αi < 1/
√
α∗.
• stays in a bounded region throughout time if αi = 1/
√
α∗.
For stars we write λi = ai,1 and µi = a1,i for all i = 1 . . . n−1. Denote by fi(t) = bn,i(t)/Bn(t)
the fraction invested by player n on player i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} in round t, with ∑n−1i=1 fi(t) = 1 for
all t. Since the proportional update is non-wasteful after the first round, we can assume that
bi,n(t) = Bi(t) for all t and all the players i = 1 . . . n− 1 (even if player i starts by investing in
multiple goods, his bid gets corrected after the first round so that he bids zero on everything
except the good of player n). An example of a star with this notation is in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Star network with player 4 at the center.
Lemma 5. The fraction of player n’s budget invested by player n on player i = 1 . . . n − 1 at
time t+ 3, given the fractions invested by player n on player i at time t, is
fi(t+ 3) =
fi(t) · λiµi∑n−1
j=1 fj(t) · λjµj
,
where λj = aj,n and µj = an,j for all j = 1 . . . n− 1.
Proof. A useful observation is that player n will always be able to get 100% of all the goods
of players 1 . . . n − 1, since he is the only bidder competing for these goods. Thus at any
time t, the amount of player n, given amounts x1(t − 1) . . . xn(t − 1) at time t − 1, will be
xn(t) =
∑n−1
i=1 xi(t − 1) · µi. Now consider the amounts, budgets, and bids xi(t), Bi(t), and
bi,j(t) at any time t. Then the amounts at time t+ 1 are given by
xn(t+ 1) =
n−1∑
j=1
xj(t) · µj
and
xi(t+ 1) =
Bi(t) · x1(t) · λi∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t)
, for all i = 1 . . . n− 1.
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The updated fractions in player n’s bids following the production are:
fi(t+ 1) =
xi(t) · µi∑n−1
k=1 xk(t) · µk
, for all i = 1 . . . n− 1.
The updated budgets are Bn(t+1) =
∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t) and Bi(t+1) = fi(t) ·Bn(t) for i = 1 . . . n−1.
Recall that since the update rule is non-wasteful after the first round, we have that bj,n(t
′) =
Bj(t
′) for each player j and time t′, so the budgets of these players are equal to their bids on
player n.
The amount of player n at time t+ 2 is
xn(t+2) =
n−1∑
j=1
xj(t+1)·µj =
n−1∑
j=1
(
Bj(t) · x1(t) · λj∑n−1
k=1 Bk(t)
)
µj =
(
xn(t)∑n−1
k=1 Bk(t)
)
·
n−1∑
j=1
Bj(t) · λjµj

while the amounts of players i = 1 . . . n− 1 are
xi(t+ 2) =
Bi(t+ 1) · x1(t+ 1) · λi∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t+ 1)
=
fi(t) ·Bn(t) ·
(∑n−1
j=1 xj(t) · µj
)
λi∑n
j=2 fj ·Bn(t)
=
fi(t) · λi ·
(∑n−1
j=1 xj(t) · µj
)
∑n−1
j=1 fj(t)
= fi(t) · λi ·
n−1∑
j=1
xj(t) · µj

The updated fractions of player n are
fi(t+ 2) =
xi(t+ 1) · µi∑n−1
j=1 xj(t+ 1) · µj
=
(
Bi(t)·xn(t)·λi∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t)
· µi
)
∑n−1
j=1
(
Bj(t)·xn(t)·λjµj∑n−1
k=1 Bk(t)
) = Bi(t) · λiµi∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t) · λjµj
The budgets for round t+ 2 are
Bn(t+ 2) =
n−1∑
j=1
Bj(t+ 1) =
n−1∑
j=1
fj(t) ·Bn(t) = Bn(t)
and for each player i = 1 . . . n− 1,
Bi(t+ 2) = fi(t+ 1) ·Bn(t+ 1) =
(
xi(t) · µi∑n−1
k=1 xk(t) · µk
)
n−1∑
j=1
Bj(t).
The amounts at time t+ 3 are
xn(t+3) =
n−1∑
j=1
xj(t+2)·µj =
n−1∑
j=1
fj(t)·λjµj ·
(
n−1∑
k=1
xk(t) · µk
)
=
n−1∑
j=1
xj(t) · µj
n−1∑
j=1
fj(t) · λjµj
 ,
while for each player i = 1 . . . n− 1,
xi(t+ 3) =
Bi(t+ 2) · xn(t+ 2) · λi∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t+ 2)
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=
(
xi(t)·µi∑n−1
k=1 xk(t)·µk
)(∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t)
)
∑n−1
j=1
(
xj(t)·µj∑n−1
k=1 xk(t)·µk
)(∑n−1
k=1 Bk(t)
)

(
xn(t)∑n−1
k=1 Bk(t)
)n−1∑
j=1
Bj(t) · λjµj
 · λi
=
xn(t) · xi(t) · λiµi ·
(∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t) · µjλj
)
(∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t)
)(∑n−1
j=1 xj(t) · µj
)
Finally, the fractions at time t+ 3 are:
fi(t+ 3) =
xi(t+ 2) · µi∑n−1
j=1 xj(t+ 2) · µj
=
fi(t) · λiµi
(∑n−1
j=1 xj(t) · µj
)
(∑n−1
j=1 xj(t) · µj
)(∑n−1
j=1 fj(t) · λjµj
) = fi(t) · λiµi∑n−1
j=1 fj(t) · λjµj
,
for each player i = 1 . . . n− 1, as required.
Lemma 6. In a star economy with player n at the center, the fraction invested by player n on
player i at time t is:
fi(t) =
fi(r) · (λiµi)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · (λjµj)bt/3c
, for r = t (mod 3),
where λj = aj,n and µj = an,j for all j = 1 . . . n− 1.
Proof. Take any r ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We prove by induction that fi(3t + r) = fi(r)·(λiµi)
t∑n−1
j=1 fj(r)·(λjµj)t
. The
base case holds since
∑n−1
j=1 fj(t
′) = 1 for all t′, so
fi(r) =
fi(r) · (λiµi)0∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · (λjµj)0
.
Suppose that fi(3(t − 1) + r) = fi(r)·(λiµi)
t−1∑n−1
j=1 fj(r)·(λjµj)t−1
holds. By Lemma 5, we have that
fi(t
′ + 3) = fi(t
′)·λiµi∑n−1
j=1 fj(t
′)·λjµj , from which we can derive the following expression for fi(r + 3t):
fi(3t+ r) =
fi(3(t− 1) + r) · λiµi∑n−1
j=1 fj(3(t− 1) + r) · λjµj
=
(
fi(r)·(λiµi)t−1∑n−1
j=1 fj(r)·(λjµj)t−1
)
· λiµi∑n−1
j=1
(
fj(r)·(λjµj)t−1∑n−1
k=1 fk(r)·(λkµk)t−1
· λjµj
)
=
fi(r) · (λiµi)t∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · (λjµj)t
This is equivalent to the required statement, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5. Denote by λj = aj,n and µj = an,j for all j = 1 . . . n − 1. Without
loss of generality, suppose the best cycle is between player 1 and player n. Consider any player
i ∈ {2, . . . , n−1}. Take any r ∈ {0, 1, 2}. By Lemma 6, we have that fi(t) = fi(r)·(λiµi)
bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r)·(λjµj)bt/3c
,
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where r = t (mod 3). By Lemma 2, there exists δ > 0 such that b1,n(t) > δ and bn,1(t) > δ for
all t, thus B1(t) > δ and Bn(t) > δ for all t. Then the budget of player i at time t+ 1 is
Bi(t+ 1) = fi(t) ·Bn(t) = fi(r) · (λiµi)
bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · (λjµj)bt/3c
·Bn(t) > δ · fi(r) · (λiµi)
bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · (λjµj)bt/3c
(3)
Moreover, since the budget of player 1 is also at least δ, we additionally have
∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t) > δ
for all t. By Proposition 4, there exist constants γ, ζ > 0 such that
γ ·
√
(α∗)t < xn(t) < ζ ·
√
(α∗)t (4)
The amount of player i at time t+ 1 can be written as
xi(t+ 1) =
Bi(t)∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t)
· λi · xn(t) (5)
Case 1 : αi > 1/
√
α∗. Using Equations 3, 4, and 5, the amount of player i at time t+ 2 can be
bounded as follows, where c is a constant independent of time, but dependent on λj , µj , δ, γ as
well as the initial amounts and bids:
xi(t+ 2) =
Bi(t+ 1)∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t+ 1)
· λi · xn(t+ 1)
> Bi(t+ 1) · λi · xn(t+ 1)
>
(
δ · fi(r) · (λiµi)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · (λjµj)bt/3c
)
· λi · xn(t+ 1)
>
(
δ · fi(r) · αbt/3ci∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
)
· λi · γ ·
√
(α∗)t+1
=
(
δ · fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
)
· λi · γ ·
√
α∗ · (α∗)t/2−bt/3c · αbt/3ci
> c ·
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
)
·
(√
α∗ · αi
)bt/3c
Since α∗ > αj for all j = 2 . . . n− 1, we get
lim
t→∞
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
= d, for some constant d > 0.
Moreover, limt→∞
(√
α∗ · αi
)bt/3c
=∞ since αi > 1/
√
α∗. It follows that limt→∞ xi(t+ 2) =
∞, which completes the first case.
Case 2 : αi < 1/
√
α∗. Again there exists a constant c′ > 0 independent of time such that we
can bound the amount of player i from above as follows:
xi(t+ 2) =
Bi(t+ 1)∑n−1
j=1 Bj(t+ 1)
· λi · xn(t+ 1)
<
Bi(t+ 1)
δ
· λi · xn(t+ 1)
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<(
fi(r) · αbt/3ci∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3ci
· Bn(t)
δ
)
· λi · ζ ·
√
(α∗)t+1
<
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3ci
)
· λi · ζ
δ
· (α∗)t/2−bt/3c · αbt/3ci
< c′ ·
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3ci
)
·
(√
α∗ · αi
)bt/3c
Again we have that limt→∞
fi(r)·(α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r)·αbt/3cj
= d > 0. However, limt→∞
(√
α∗ · αi
)bt/3c
= 0 since
√
α∗ · αi < 1, which implies that limt→∞ xi(t) = 0.
Case 3 : αi = 1/
√
α∗. From Case 1 and 2, we obtain the following lower and upper bounds for
the amount of player i:
c·
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
)
·
(√
α∗ · αi
)bt/3c
< xi(t+2) < c
′·
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3ci
)
·
(√
α∗ · αi
)bt/3c
Since αi = 1/
√
α∗, we equivalently get
c ·
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
)
< xi(t+ 2) < c
′ ·
(
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3ci
)
Since limt→∞
fi(r)·(α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r)·αbt/3cj
= d ∈ (0, 1), there exist constants d′, d′′ > 0 such that
d′ <
fi(r) · (α∗)bt/3c∑n−1
j=1 fj(r) · αbt/3cj
< d′′ for all t.
Then the bounds on xi(t + 2) can be rewritten as c · d′ < xi(t + 2) < c′ · d′′, where c, c′, d′, d′′
are constants, and so player i’s amount stays in a constant interval bounded away from zero
throughout time. This completes the proof.
We conjecture that for each player with αi = 1/
√
α∗, the amount forms a pseudo-cycle that
converges to a cycle in the limit.
The growth pattern of player 1 when its cycle with the center is exactly at the threshold
can be observed in Figure 7, and improved and degraded afterwards, in Figure 8.We leave open
the question of understanding phase transitions more generally. We include several additional
examples in Appendix D with phase transitions in two-player economies.
7 Fixed Points and Cycles
We briefly study fixed points and cycles. The proofs for this section are in Appendix C.
Proposition 9. Let ~a be an economy that cycles with period T ≥ 1. Then every cycle C along
which the amounts and bids are non-zero throughout time has a product one.
For fixed points in the bid space, we get the following statement for complete graphs.
Proposition 10. Suppose the economy has a complete graph. If the bids are unchanging
throughout time, then
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(a) Star economy. (b) Amount of player 3 over time
(30 rounds).
(c) Amount of player 3 over time
(300 rounds)
(d) Amount of player 4 over time
(300 rounds)
Figure 8: Star with three players, with matrix a = [[0, 0, 0.8], [0, 0, 1.5625], [1, 1, 0]] and initial
bids b = [[0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 1], [0.5, 0.5, 0]]. Player 1’s simple cycle with player 3 (the center) has
product α1 = 0.8 · 1 = 0.8, while the best cycle is that of player 2 with the center: α∗ =
1.5625 · 1 = 1.5625, where α1 = 1/
√
α∗. The amount of player 1 approximately cycles.
• the growth of each player i is given by xi(t+ 1) = ai,i · xi(t), for all t ∈ N.
• for each cycle C ⊆ N , the coefficients satisfy the identity: ∏(i,j)∈C ai,j = ∏i∈C ai,i.
Two player economies in which all cycles have product 1 always cycle as long as each player
starts by bidding equally on the goods.
Proposition 11. Any two player economy where all cycles have product one 6 cycles with period
3 for any initial budgets and amounts, when the players start by splitting their budgets equally
on the goods.
Our simulation shows that in fact economies with up to five players cycle for any initial
configuration of the amounts and budgets, as long as the players split their budgets equally
among the goods, and the period remains 3.
8 Gini Index Simulation
We studied in simulations the Gini index of multiple economies, with additional simulations in
Appendix E.
Figure 10 shows a two player economy ~a = [[x, 0.1], [15, y]] where the x and y values are
represented on the X and Y axes. All initial amounts are 1 and all initial bids are 0.5. The
Gini coefficient is computed after 120 iterations, and lighter shades mean higher inequality. It
can be observed that there is a threshold at around 1.25 such that to the right of this value,
both on the X and Y axis, the inequality is very high. The reason is that the product of the
6That is, for every C ⊆ N , ∏(i,j)∈C ai,j = 1.
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(a) Star economy where the
cycle of player 3 with 4 is
above the 0.8 threshold.
(b) Amount of player 3 over time
(300 rounds).
(c) Star economy where the
cycle of player 3 with 4 is
below the 0.8 threshold
(d) Amount of player 3 over time
(300 rounds).
Figure 9: Star economy where player 3’s threshold for growth is the value 0.8 in its cycle with
the center. Sub-figure (b) shows what happens with its quantity when the edge (4, 3) is changed
from 2 as it was in Figure 9 to 2.05, while sub-figure (d) shows the evolution of its amount when
this edge is changed instead to 1.95.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 10: Gini index for ~a = [[x, 0.1], [15, y]], where the x and y values are on the X and Y
axes.
cycle containing both players 1 and 2 is 1.5, with a geometric mean of around 1.225. When the
self-loop of player 1 becomes higher than this value (at the right of the figure), the inequality
becomes very high because player 1 has the best cycle and will grow at a much faster rate than
player 2 over time. The figure is symmetric, with the diagonal line showing blue because when
both players have the same value for the self loops they will do equally well.
Figure 11 shows the Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[1, 0.1], [15, 1]] with
initial bids [[1−x, x], [y, 1−y]] and initial amounts 1. The only good cycle contains both players.
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(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 11: Gini index for ~a = [[1, 0.1], [15, 1]] with initial bids [[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]].
The inequality in this case comes from the differences in the initial bids of the players and from
the fact that player 1 sees a “bad” edge (of 0.1) from player 2 compared to his own self-loop,
while player 2 sees a very good edge incoming from player 1 (worth 15). Thus player 1 is much
slower to invest on player 2 than player 2 is on 1.
At a high level, our findings on the Gini coefficient are related to the discussion on the merits
of capitalism versus socialism [Mar06, Pik15, vH44, vM20] and their respective failures. In par-
ticular, in recent years a growing concern exists regarding the rising levels of inequality around
the world, including countries such as United Kingdom [Wil17] and United States [Gro16].
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A Economy with Fixed Splitting Rule
Example 3. Consider a two player economy with ~a = [[1.1, 0], [0.2, 0]], meaning that player 1
can make 1.1 units (of good 1) from one unit of good 1 and zero units from one unit of good 2,
while player 2 can make 0.2 units (of good 2) from one unit of good 1 and zero units from one
unit of good 2. Let the initial amounts be xi(0) = 1.
If the mechanism is to give each player 100% of his own good in every round, then x1(1) =
1.1 · x1(0) = 1.1, x1(2) = 1.1 · x1(1) = 1.12, and generally, x1(t) = 1.1 · x1(t − 1) = 1.1t−1.
Player 2 receives a zero fraction of good 2, and he cannot produce anything from his own good,
so x2(1) = 0.2 · x1(0) + 0 · x2(0) = 0.2 · 1 + 0 · 1 = 0, and then x2(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 1. So player
1 grows while player 2 vanishes.
Suppose on the other hand that the mechanism splits the goods equally each time, so in every
round each player gets 50% of every resource. Then the bundles obtained after trade at time
t = 0 are ~y1(0) = (0.5, 0.5), ~y2(0) = (0.5, 0.5), so the amounts produced at time t = 1 will be
x1(1) = 1.1 ·y1,1(0)+0 ·y1,2(0) = 1.1 ·0.5 = 0.55 while x2(1) = 0.2 ·y2,1(0)+0 ·y2,2(0) = 0.2 ·0.5 =
0.1. After trade at time t = 1 the bundles obtained by players 1 and 2 are ~y1(1) = (0.275, 0.05)
and ~y2(1) = (0.275, 0.05), which will lead to new amounts x1(2) = 1.1 · 0.275 + 0 · 0.05 = 0.3025
and x2(2) = 0.2 · 0.275 + 0 · 0.05 = 0.055. By induction it can be shown that x1(t) = 0.55t−1 and
x2(t) = 0.2 ·0.5 ·0.55t−1. Thus limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 for i = 1, 2, so both players vanish in the limit.
The interpretation of this is that player 1 is “productive” by himself, but he is not so pro-
ductive as to support both himself and another player receiving equal shares throughout time.
B General Mechanisms
In this section we show two characterizations, for economies that cannot be saved by any
mechanism because all their cycles are bad, and economies in which any reasonable mechanism
should achieve growth.
Proposition 12. [2 in main text] A strongly connected economy grows with any non-wasteful
mechanism if and only if (i) it has least one good cycle and (ii) each directed cycle is either
good or has zero edges all along.
Proof. For the reverse direction, suppose all the non-zero cycles have product strictly greater
than 1. An arbitrary non-wasteful mechanism can be seen as an infinite sequence of fixed
splitting rules. To be precise, if x(t) is the production vector at time t and βi,j(t) is the fraction
of good j agent i receives after production of x(t) then, production in time (t+ 1) is,
x(t+ 1) = 〈A, β(t)〉x(t)
where 〈A, β〉 is a matrix whose (i, j)th entry is aijβi,j(t). By unraveling this we get that total
production
∑
i∈G xi(t) is a convex combination of product of ai,js along all t length (non-simple)
paths. If t is big enough then these paths have to self-intersect and thereby contain cycles. Take
any such path P = (i1, i2, . . . , it). Whenever a vertex repeats, a cycle is formed. Once all the
cycles are removed, what remains is a set of simple path segments that are not part of any
cycle, and their total length is at most n (number of nodes in the graph). The product of ai,js
on the edges of these path segments is at least τ = (min(i,j),ai,j>0 ai,j)
n. Let γ be the lower
bound (Π(i,j)∈Cai,j) for any cycle C. Then by hypothesis γ > 1. Now for any integer h > 0,
there exists an integer k such that γkτ > h, and therefore, for t = n ∗ k + n,
Π
(t−1)
q=1 aiq ,i(q+1) ≥ γkτ > h
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Since total production is a convex combination of such product terms across all t length
paths, it too is at least h, proving the claim.
For the forward direction, suppose the economy grows with any non-wasteful mechanism.
This is clearly not possible if product of ai,j ’s along every cycle is zero. Therefore, there is
at least one cycle C such that Π(i,j)∈Cai,j > 0. However, suppose Π(i,j)∈Cai,j ≤ 1. We will
construct a non-wasteful splitting rule under which the economy can not grow infinitely. Every
node in the cycle will send all of its produced good to its successor on the cycle. To decide for
the rest, shrink the cycle into one node vC , and all the incoming and outgoing edges, except
the cycle edges, of nodes on the cycle are now the incoming and outgoing edges respectively of
node vC . Note that the resulting graph, say GC remains strongly connected.
Construct the BFS tree in GC rooted at vC using only incoming edges at every node. This
will create a path from every node in GC to node vC . Each node not on C sends all its production
to its successor in the BFS tree. Since longest path in the BFS tree is of length at most n,
clearly, after n rounds all nodes outside C will have no production. And after that the total
production on C will either decrease or remain constant.
If all the cycles are bad, then no mechanism can save the economy from shrinking.
Proposition 13. [1 in main text] An economy vanishes with any mechanism if and only if all
the cycles have product strictly less than 1.
Proof. Let ~a be an economy where all the cycles have product less than 1 and M some mech-
anism that is used on ~a. Similarly to Theorem 2, the mechanism M can be seen as an infinite
sequence of fixed splitting rules. The total amount can get a temporary boost from traveling
on a path of length at most n − 1; this boost is bounded by a constant (that depends on the
coefficients ai,j but is independent of time), while any amount of flow returns from a cycle re-
duced by a factor of at least 1−  for some fixed  > 0, so the the total amount in ~a goes to zero
as t → ∞. For the other direction, suppose ~a vanishes regardless of the mechanism. If ~a had
a cycle with product greater than or equal to 1, then the total amount could remain bounded
away from zero by having each player along the cycle directly route their good to their successor
in each round. Since this is not the case, it follows that ~a cannot have any such cycle.
C Fixed Points and Cycles
Proposition 14. [9 in main text] Let ~a be an economy that cycles with period T ≥ 1. Then
every cycle C along which the amounts and bids are non-zero throughout time has product one.
Proof. Since the economy cycles with period T , we have xi(t+T ) = xi(t) and bi,j(t+T ) = bi,j(t)
for all i, j ∈ N and t ∈ N. Let C ⊆ N be any cycle. Let α = ∏(i,j)∈C ai,j and define
F (t) =
∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(t) ·xi(t). By Theorem 3, F (t) = αt ·F (0). Then F (t+T ) =
∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(t+
T ) · xi(t + T ) =
∏
(i,j)∈C bi,j(t) · xi(t) = αt+T · F (0) = αt · F (0), so αt+T = αt. Since C was
chosen to have non-zero bids and amounts throughout time, it follows that α = 1.
For fixed points in the bid space, we get the following characterization.
Proposition 15. [15 in main text] Suppose the economy has a complete graph. If the bids are
unchanging throughout time, then
• the growth of each player i is given by xi(t+ 1) = ai,i · xi(t), for all t ∈ N.
• for each cycle C ⊆ N , the coefficients satisfy the identity: ∏(i,j)∈C ai,j = ∏i∈C ai,i.
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(a) Two player economy.
(b) Amounts over time (c) Players’ bids over time, with red
and blue for player 1 and green and or-
ange for player 2.
Figure 12: Economy that cycles with period 3. The initial amounts are (1, 1) and budgets
(25, 100). The players start by splitting their budgets equally between the goods.
Proof. Let b∗i,j > 0 be the fixed bids for all i, j ∈ N . From the bid update rule and the fact that
bi,j(t+ 1) = bi,j(t) = b
∗
i,j , we have
bi,j(t) = bi,j(t+ 1) =
(
ai,j · yi,j(t)
xi(t+ 1)
)
·Bi(t+ 1) =
ai,j · bi,j(t)Bj(t+1) · xj(t)
xi(t+ 1)
 ·Bi(t+ 1),
which implies
ai,j =
xi(t+ 1) ·Bj(t+ 1)
xj(t) ·Bi(t+ 1)
Taking i = j, we get that ai,i = xi(t+ 1)/xi(t). Then for any cycle C we get that∏
(i,j)∈C
ai,j =
∏
(i,j)∈C
xi(t+ 1) ·Bj(t+ 1)
xj(t) ·Bi(t+ 1) =
∏
i∈C
xi(t+ 1)
xi(t)
=
∏
i∈C
ai,i,
which is the second required property.
Proposition 16. [11 in main text] Any two player economy where all cycles have product one
7 cycles with period 3 for any initial budgets and amounts, when the players start by splitting
their budgets equally between the goods.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary two player economy where all the cycles have product 1. Then
a1,1 = a2,2 = 1 and a1,2 = c, a2,1 = 1/c for some c > 0. Let Bi(0) and xi(0) be arbitrary initial
budgets and amounts of the players. By the normalization of money, we have that B2(0) =
7That is, for every C ⊆ N , ∏(i,j)∈C ai,j = 1.
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1− B1(0). The players start by investing equally on the goods, so b1,1(0) = b1,2(0) = B1(0)/2,
while b2,1(0) = b2,2(0) = 0.5−B1(0)/2. The amounts after the first round of production are:
x1(1) =
b1,1(0)
b1,1(0) + b2,1(0)
· a1,1 · x1(0) + b1,2(0)
b1,2(0) + b2,2(0)
· a1,2 · x2(0) = B1(0)(x1(0) + c · x2(0))
x2(1) = (1−B1(0))
(
x1(0)
c
+ x2(0)
)
The updated budgets are B1(1) = B2(1) = 0.5, while the updated bids are
b1,1(1) =
0.5x1(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0) and b1,2(1) =
0.5 · c · x2(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0)
b2,1(1) =
0.5x1(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0) and b2,2(1) =
0.5 · c · x2(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0)
For the second round, since b1,1(1) = b2,1(1) and b1,2(1) = b2,2(1), we have
x1(2) = 0.5 · x1(1) + 0.5 · c · x2(1) = 0.5B1(0)(x1(0) + c · x2(0)) + 0.5c(1−B1(0))
(
x1(0)
c
+ x2(0)
)
= 0.5(x1(0) + c · x2(0))
x2(2) = 0.5 · 1
c
· x1(1) + 0.5 · x2(1) = 0.5
c
(x1(0) + c · x2(0))
The updated budgets are B1(2) = x1(0)/(x1(0)+c·x2(0)) and B2(2) = c·x2(0)/(x1(0)+c·x2(0)),
while the bids become
b1,1(2) = =
B1(0)x1(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0) and b1,2(2) =
(1−B1(0))x1(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0)
b2,1(2) = =
B1(0) · c · x2(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0) and b2,2(2) =
(1−B1(0)) · c · x2(0)
x1(0) + c · x2(0)
Finally, for the third round, it can be verified that the economy returns to the initial state, with
xi(3) = xi(0) and bi,j(3) = bi,j(0) for all i, j.
An example of a cycling economy with two players can be found in Figure 11.
D Simulations for Phase Transitions
In Figure 13 it can be seen that the fraction it invests on player 1 approximately cycles (the
peaks are not 100% identical).
Figure 13 shows an example of how the amounts, budgets, fractions invested by the players
on each other, and the Gini coefficient evolve over time in an economy where the only good
cycle is the self loop of player 1, while Figure 14 shows the same economy with the exception
that the self loop of player 2 has been reduced to 0.83 (from 0.85); the result is that player 2
now vanishes.
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(a) 200 iterations (b) 40 iterations
Figure 13: Two player economy with a = [[1.2, 0.2], [1.1, 0.9]], where the fraction of the budget
invested by player 1 on good 2 (approximatey) cycles.
(a) Two player economy. (b) Amount of player 2 over time.
(c) Fraction invested by each player on
the other player.
(d) Budgets of the players.
Figure 14: Two player economy with amounts, budgets, fractions invested by the players on
each other, and Gini coefficient over time. The only good cycle is the self loop of player 1 but
player 2 also grows. Player 1 is shown in black and player 2 in purple.
E Simulations for the Gini Index
In this section we provide simulations for the Gini coefficient of two player economies. We plot
the Gini coefficient for both amounts and budgets and consider several scenarios: varying self
loops (keeping the edges between the players fixed), varying edges between the players (keeping
the self loops fixed), and varying initial bids (keeping the economy fixed).
In Figures 15-17 the coefficient is computed after 120 iterations, and in the remaining ones
(18-25) after 350 iterations.
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(a) Two player economy. (b) Amount of player 2 over time.
(c) Fraction invested by each player on
the other player.
Figure 15: Economy with the same initial state as the one in the previous Figure (13), except
the self loop of player 2 has been decreased from 0.85 to 0.83, and player 2 now decays. Player
1 is shown in black and player 2 in purple.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 16: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[x, 0.1], [15, y]] where the x and y
values are represented on the X and Y axes. Initial amounts are 1 and all initial bids are 0.5.
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(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 17: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[1, x], [y, 1]] where the x and y values
are represented on the X and Y axes. The initial amounts are 1, the initial bids 0.5, and the
coefficient is computed after 120 iterations.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 18: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[0, x], [y, 0.5]] where the x and y
values are represented on the X and Y axes. The initial amounts are 1, initial bids 0.5.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 19: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[0.25, 0.1], [15, 0.25]] with initial bids
[[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
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(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 20: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[0.25, 0.1], [15, 0.25]] with initial bids
[[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 21: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[1, 0.1], [15, 1]] with initial bids
[[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 22: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[1.21, 0.1], [15, 1.21]] with initial bids
[[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
40
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 23: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[
√
1.5, 0.1], [15,
√
1.5]] with initial
bids [[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 24: Gini coefficient for the economy ~a = [[1.24, 0.1], [15, 1.24]] with initial bids [[1 −
x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 25: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[1.4, 0.1], [15, 1.4]] with initial bids
[[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
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(a) Budgets. (b) Amounts.
Figure 26: Gini coefficient for the two-player economy ~a = [[2, 0.1], [15, 2]] with initial bids
[[1− x, x], [y, 1− y]] and initial amounts 1.
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